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The Dynamic of Repression:
The Global Impact of the Stalinist Model,
1944-1953
 By Szalontai Balazs (Hungary)
     As long as Stalin was alive, no Communist regime except Tito’s questioned
openly the infallibility of the Soviet dictator, and adulation of the Vozhd’ never
was in short supply. As a consequence, a lot of historians and Sovietologists
concluded that the smaller countries – with the possible exception of China –
had merely copied Soviet domestic policies, and imitation in toto had been
explicitly prescribed by the ruler in the Kremlin. Soviet influence was indeed
extensive but by no means absolute. Deviations from Soviet policies, though
unpublicized that time, could be quite significant, and a comparative analysis
may contribute to the reinterpretation of Soviet Stalinism. Asymmetrical and
normative comparisons, however, would hardly facilitate such efforts. While
one should not regard the policies of the various Communist parties and regimes
merely as the reflection of previous or contemporary Soviet domestic and foreign
policies, undue emphasis on the ’method of difference’ may contrast the
comprehensive analysis of a ’satellite’ regime with a frozen and simplified image
of Soviet Stalinism. One also should be aware of that the similarity or difference
of institutions and policies did not necessarily indicate political sympathy or
aversion: in a number of cases they simply reflected the specific socioeconomic
and political realities of a country.
      For various reasons, this essay concentrates on a single aspect of Stalinist
policies, namely, political repression. The whole ’Stalin phenomenon,’ due to
its great complexity, could not have been covered adequately on the pages of a
short study. (It was the same factor that prevented the author from making a
comparison between Soviet and Chinese policies. China’s enormous size, its
special status within the ’Soviet bloc,’ and the peculiar traditions of the Chinese
Communist guerrilla movement would have necessitated such an extensive
analysis that proved incompatible with the framework of this essay.) This
emphasis on repression, however, does not mean the „criminalization” of Soviet
and Communist history. Stalinist policies proved inseparable from terror, but
the dynamic of repression was also influenced by factors beyond the horizon of
* This is a revised version of the orginial, which was first published in Russian History/Histoire
Russe, Issue 2-4 (2003), pp. 415-442
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security chiefs and labor camp commandants. It is tempting to explain the Great
Terror by simply emphasizing the destructive potential of Communist ideology,
yet that ideology did not always lead to a destruction of such a magnitude.
While every Stalinist regime was repressive enough, the slaughter of tens and
hundreds of thousands did not take place in every country ruled by a Stalinist
dictatorship. The mere existence of certain less destructive alternatives refutes
those interpretations which regard even the worst manifestations of political
(not necessarily Communist) repression as having been somehow predetermined
by ideological factors. Quite paradoxically, these explanations actually
understate the personal responsibility of the various dictators.
Prelude in Mongolia
     By the time the Red Army entered Eastern Europe, the Soviet leaders had
gained substantial experience in establishing and controlling a satellite regime.
Moscow’s „oldest political satellite” (George G. S. Murphy) was the Mongolian
People’s Republic, proclaimed in 1924. According to Zoltan Barany, „it appears
that Soviet leaders learned many tricks of the ’takeover trade’” in Mongolia.1
In any case, this similarity is a good argument for a comparative study, but the
differences between Mongolian and East European policies may reveal even
more about the dynamic of Stalinist repression. In addition, the comparative
analysis of the Soviet and Mongolian purges may throw some light on the origins
of Stalin’s Great Terror. Since the policies pursued by the Mongolian leaders
were often dictated by Moscow, it is all the more interesting that in several
cases the timing and characteristics of these measures precluded the possibility
of simple and indiscriminate imitation. In other words, the Soviet leadership
(including Stalin) did not consider the Soviet political and economic model the
sole correct one but devised different methods for Mongolia. It is necessary to
point out, though, that these differences remained within the framework of a
one-party dictatorship.
     The Mongolian Communist party (known as Mongolian People’s Party, then
as Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party) was officially founded in 1920,
and one year later the military assistance it received from the Red Army enabled
it to seize power. The MPP/MPRP proved a far cry from the Bolshevik Party,
however. Contemporary Mongolian society lacked an industrial working class,
and since the party’s initial program was reformist, rather than revolutionary, a
1 Zoltan Barany, „Soviet Takeovers: The Role of Advisers in Mongolia in the 1920s and in Eastern Europe
after World War II,” in East European Quarterly Vol. XXVIII (January 1995), No. 4, p. 414.
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number of non-Communist nationalists, lamas and princes joined it in order to
liberate the Mongols from Chinese rule. Due to its unusual social composition,
feeble organization, and heterogeneous leadership, in the pre-1929 period the
party did not play the same role in domestic politics as its Soviet counterpart.
First of all, it could not control effectively the actions of its ultra-radical Youth
League (Revsomols) but often felt threatened by the latter. The Soviets, on their
part, made use of the frequent intra-party squabbles, and of the Revsomols’s
radicalism, to put pressure on certain ’rightist’ party leaders, and intervened directly
in Mongolian party affairs.2 As a consequence, MPP/MPRP leaders fell victim to
purges much earlier than CPSU leaders would do. In 1922 Premier Bodoo was
forced to resign, then arrested by the security service and shot. In 1924 a Revsomols
death squad headed by Choibalsan executed Danzan, a former MPP chairman.
Neither execution was preceded by any trial.3 The harshness of these repressive
measures stood in marked contrast with the regime’s quite moderate and flexible
economic and cultural policies. For instance, the total number of lamas actually
increased between 1924 and 1927, and the wealth of the Buddhist church remained
largely intact.4 This dichotomy between the political and the economic spheres
would be also characteristic of the 1930s and 1940s. The Mongolian dictatorship
was a Communist regime, and a very repressive one, at that, but it did not become
’totalitarian’ as quickly as its Soviet model.
     In 1929 the leftist members of the MPRP leadership, following Soviet
directives, launched a campaign against the country’s traditional elites and
attempted to force the nomadic herdsmen into cooperatives. That time Moscow
certainly wanted to apply the Soviet model on Mongolia, but the attempt ended
in a complete economic and political disaster. Livestock losses amounted to a
third of the herds, and a very substantial part of the population rose in armed
rebellion. While the MPRP leaders doggedly clung to their ultra-leftist line,
Stalin concluded that the situation demanded the implementation of a ’New
Turn Policy.’ In 1932 the Mongolian government, having been rebuked by the
Comintern, dissolved all cooperatives and most state farms, and returned the
animals to private ownership. Forcibly secularized lamas could return to their
monasteries, and certain categories of lamas regained their electoral rights.5
2 Robert Rupen, How Mongolia is Really Ruled. A Political History of the Mongolian People’s Republic
1900-1978 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), pp. 42-43.
3 Shagdariin Sandag and Harry H. Kendall, Poisoned Arrows. The Stalin-Choibalsan Mongolian Massacres,
1921-1941 (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000), pp. 30-33, 52-55.
4 C.R. Bawden, The Modern History of Mongolia  (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), 258-261.
5 Ibid., pp. 312-324., 352; Tsedendambyn Batbayar, „Stalin’s Strategy in Mongolia, 1932-1936,” in
Mongolian Studies Vol. 22 (1999), pp. 2-8.
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Collectivization would not be renewed until the mid-1950s, and other aspects
of socioeconomic transformation along Communist lines (with the exception
of the persecution of Buddhism) also received little emphasis in the 1932-1953
period. For instance, „the extension of general education to the Mongols did
not take place until the late 1940’s and the 1950’s.” In 1934 the Soviets „handed
control over joint Soviet-Mongol companies to the Mongols.”6 The ’New Turn
Policy,’ a brainchild of Moscow, bore a  resemblance to the ’New Courses’
initiated in Eastern Europe in 1953-1954. This similarity questions the widely
held assumption that attributes the post-1953 ’New Courses’ solely to Stalin’s
death. Since Stalin and Khrushchev resorted to quite similar methods in order
to solve the political and socioeconomic problems of their respective satellites,
leader-centric interpretations may overlook certain important aspects of the
history of the Soviet regime. The continuity between the Stalin and the post-
Stalin era did not manifest itself exclusively in the persistence of repressive
measures. A tradition of self-correction also seems to have existed throughout
the seven decades that followed the October Revolution, though 1953 was
undoubtedly a milestone of crucial importance.
     In the first half of the 1930s the Mongolian political system, and its repressive
actions, still differed from the Soviet regime in several respects. First of all,
Mongolian party purges and upheavals affected a significantly higher proportion
of the membership than Soviet proverki did. In 1928-1929 the MPRP lost a
third of its members; in 1932, three-fifths; and in 1934, four-fifths. Party
membership dropped from 42,000 in 1932 to 8,000 in 1934.7 As a consequence,
in 1933 a CC plenum reversed the previous relationship between the MPRP
and the government, and strictly subordinated the former to the latter – an
unlikely development in a Communist country.8 (The party would later regain
its influence, however.) On the other hand, 1933-1934 proved an important
watershed. In three big ’spy trials’, more than 50 high-ranking party and state
officials, military officers, and lamas were sentenced to death and some 260 to
imprisonment on fabricated charges; a further 126 were taken to the USSR.
The interrogators used torture in order to extract false confessions, and when
CC Secretary Lhumbe, one of the chief defendants, refused to plead guilty, the
security service took him to the Soviet Union for further torture. These refined
methods of interrogation „were used for the first time in Mongolia in dealing
6 George G.S. Murphy, Soviet Mongolia. A Study of the Oldest Political Satellite (Berkeley-Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1966), p. 132-133., 144.
7 Rupen, How Mongolia is Really Ruled, pp. 58-59.
8 Bawden, The Modern History of Mongolia, pp. 330-360.
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with the Lhumbe Affair.” The trials of the so-called Hentii and Eastern Groups
took place in December 1933, while the Central Group (including Lhumbe)
was prosecuted in July 1934.9 That is, the methods characteristic of the Soviet
Great Terror (the purge and execution of top party cadres, the staged trials, the
systematic use of torture in order to extract false confessions, and the charges
of espionage) had appeared in Mongolia more than a year before analogous
events happened in the Soviet Union.
     The lead the Mongolian purges took over their Soviet counterparts flatly
contradicts the common image of a satellite copying the policies of its model.
Does this fact also enable us to reinterpret the Soviet Great Terror itself? It may
not, since, as indicated earlier, the Kremlin often pursued different policies at
home and in the MPR. The execution of a CC Secretary on fabricated charges,
unheard-of in the USSR before 1935-1936, was no novelty in Mongolia, a
country that had lost such important leaders as Bodoo and Danzan as early as
1922-1924. On the other hand, certain aspects of the Lhumbe Affair deserve
attention. While the purges of 1922-1924 had not been accompanied by Soviet-
style staged trials, the Lhumbe Affair, as well as the terror that would follow it
in 1937-1939, was. The purge of 1933-1934 had been carefully planned by
OGPU advisers Chibisov and Grigoriev, and it was OGPU officers Ratuzov,
Iliev, Badmayan, and Sorokin who interrogated Lhumbe in the Soviet Union.
Since the Soviet leaders, if they wanted to remove a Mongolian politician,
could easily achieve this aim by exiling him to the USSR (as it happened to two
ultra-leftist leaders, Badrakh and Shijee, in 1932),10 it is quite unlikely that
they would have devised such sophisticated methods solely for Mongolian use
if they had not intended to use them at home as well. A possible explanation is
that as early as 1933 Stalin concluded that it had become necessary to execute
at least some of his intra-party opponents. While in the Soviet Union such cruel
methods, if used prematurely, could have been counterproductive, there was
no comparable risk in the MPR, a country dominated by Moscow. The trials
staged by the Mongolian regime resulted, from the very beginning, in the
execution of some defendants. By contrast, in 1935 Zinoviev and Kamenev
received only prison sentences, and it was their second trial that led to their
execution. The gradualism that characterized the Soviet purges in 1934-1936
may have been rooted in Stalin’s attempt to conceal his ultimate aims (and thus
9 Bat-Erdene Batbayar, Twentieth Century Mongolia (Cambridge: The White Horse Press, 1999), pp. 329-
331; Sandag and Kendall, Poisoned Arrows, pp. 72-73.
10 Batbayar, Twentieth Century Mongolia, pp. 320-321, 350-351.
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prevent the emergence of a determined opposition).11 Had Stalin’s various
victims known that they would be eventually executed, they may have created
a united bloc capable of stopping the dictator’s Juggernauth.
     In 1935-1937 the Mongolian regime publicly tried several higher-ranking
lamas, and when Stalin launched his Great Terror, the Mongolian dictator
Choibalsan quickly followed suit. The Mongolian Great Purges began in Sep-
tember 1937 and lasted until the spring of 1939. It was the arrival of two new
Soviet advisers, Glazkov and Militsin, that heralded the end of mass terror.
Similarly to Yezhov, a number of Mongolian security chiefs directly responsible
for the previous repressive measures (e.g. Nasantogtoh, Bayasgalan, and
Dashtseveg) were eliminated in 1939, though the execution of several promi-
nent party leaders, such as Laagan, Amar, Dogsom, Badrakh, and Shijee, took
place as late as 1940-1941. These similarities were close enough to be explained
by conscious, though hardly voluntary, imitation. In addition, the scope of the
Mongolian Great Terror reached, or even surpassed, that of the Soviet Great
Purges. At the end of 1939, Choibalsan noted in his diary that 56,938 persons
(including 17,335 lamas) had been arrested between 1937 and November 1939,
and 20,396 of them were executed. 36 of the 51 CC members elected by the
Fourth MPRP Congress, and all Presidium members except Choibalsan per-
ished in the purges.12 By contrast, neither of the Soviet-dominated East Euro-
pean dictatorships (with the possible exception of the Hoxha regime) was re-
sponsible for a comparable intra-party bloodbath. Significantly, in January 1962
the Hungarian Ambassador to Ulan Bator reported that the number of victims
had been „disproportionately higher” in the MPR than in the other ’people’s
democracies.’13 This difference is worth analyzing, and we will come back to
that later.
11 On the zigzags in Stalin’s pre-1937 policies, see, among others, J. Arch Getty and Oleg V. Naumov, The
Road to Terror. Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932-1939 (New Haven-London: Yale
University Press, 1999), pp. 578-582. Getty and Naumov rightly point out that Stalin did not face a coherent
’moderate bloc,’ and he repeatedly proved more flexible than his lieutenants did. On the other hand, Stalin’s
„angelic patience” may have been a conscious strategy to dissuade the (real and potential) opposition from
taking a firm stand. The dictator seems to have pursued a „stick and carrot” policy in order to make his potential
victims believe that they were not in serious danger unless they somehow provoked Stalin.
12 Batbayar, Twentieth Century Mongolia, pp. 359-372. See also, among others, Christopher Kaplonski,
„Blame, Guilt, and Avoidance. The Struggle to Control the Past in Post-Socialist Mongolia,” in History and
Memory Vol. 11 (1999), No. 2, pp. 96-98.
13 Hungarian Embassy to the MPR, Report, 23 January 1962, XIX-J-1-j [Top Secret Documents] Kína
1945-1964 [henceforth CTS], 7. doboz, 5/bc, 0010/RT/1962. All the Hungarian archival documents referred to
in this essay are available in the Hungarian National Archives (MOL).
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 The Wave of Post-Occupation Violence
      Apart from Mongolia, the Soviet Union had not had any satellite before
World War II. In  the 1944-1949 period, however, a number of Communist
regimes were established in Eastern Europe and Asia. The circumstances of
their conception and birth varied from country to country. In a free election held
in 1946, the Czechoslovak party – uniquely in Eastern Europe – received more
votes than any of its rivals, and its leader, Gottwald, became Prime Minister. In
East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Romania, and North Korea the local Commu-
nist parties had to reckon with, and could rely on, the administration set up by
the Soviet occupiers, while the Yugoslav, Albanian, and Chinese parties came to
power due to their military triumph over various foreign and domestic oppo-
nents. (Soviet troops were withdrawn from Bulgaria and North Korea in 1947
and 1949 respectively.) The Bulgarian partisans would have hardly taken Sofia
without the Soviet invasion of 1944, but the armed force they possessed was
certainly a substantial one if compared to the ineffectiveness of the German,
Hungarian, Czech, and Romanian Communist resistance movements. The Slo-
vak and Korean guerrilla movements, though significant in certain periods of
the war, had been largely stamped out before the entry of the Red Army. The
Polish Communists also had a considerable fighting force of their own, but it
did not operate as independently from Soviet troops as it was the case in Yugo-
slavia, Albania, and China. In 1945 the Vietnamese Communists, having cre-
ated an anti-Japanese guerrilla force, succeeded in seizing power, but the return
of the French prevented them from consolidating their regime in the whole coun-
try. While Hungary and Czechoslovakia had ’genuine multi-party coalitions’
before 1947-1948, the other regimes (above all, Yugoslavia, Albania, and North
Korea) began to manipulate elections and restricting the freedom of democratic
opposition as early as 1945-1946.
     In certain countries the establishment of the Communist regimes was
accompanied with the execution of thousands of real and alleged political
opponents. Since these executions usually claimed far more lives than the ones
carried out in the 1948-1953 period, they deserve particular attention. Of the
countries affected, it was probably Yugoslavia that experienced the worst
violence. In May and June 1945 Tito’s partisans executed more than 18,000
„Ustashas, White Guards, and Ljotic followers” (that is, members of Croatian,
Slovene, and Serbian collaborationist organizations) near Kocevje.14 When
14 Noel Malcolm, Bosnia. A Short History (London: Macmillan London Limited, 1994), p. 193; Jasper
Ridley, Tito (London: Constable and Company Limited, 1994), pp. 254-257.
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partisan troops entered villages in Bosnia (and elsewhere), it often happened
that „all potential opponents, mainly people of higher social standing and
intellectuals known to be believers, were simply put to death without any judicial
proceedings or investigation.”15 The mass executions carried out by the partisan
forces in Vojvodina late in 1944 resulted in the death of thousands, possibly
tens of thousands, of ethnic Hungarian civilians.16 The German minority similarly
suffered high losses: some 60,000 individuals died in the internment camps run
by the Yugoslav Communist authorities or en route, while another 15-20,000
were killed by partisan or Soviet troops.17
     In 1944-1945 the newly established Albanian Communist regime launched
a campaign against collaborators, northern (Gheg) nationalists, tribal leaders,
upper-class families, Catholic priests, and intellectuals. Special tribunals, staffed
entirely by judges with no legal training, sentenced thousands to death, forced
labor, or imprisonment. Similarly to Chinese Communist practices, it was left
to spectators, the latter having been instigated by the police, to determine
punishment.18 In the same years Bulgarian Communist partisans executed or
arbitrarily murdered thousands, possibly tens of thousands, of people. While
some victims had indeed been closely associated with the royal dictatorship or
the extreme right, many others merely belonged to the non-Communist
intelligentsia, the Orthodox clergy, or the middle classes. Following these
massacres, People’s Courts sentenced 12,000 individuals to death for war crimes,
of whom over 2,700 were actually executed.19 By 1948, after five years of
armed struggle, the Polish Communist forces, backed by Soviet security and
military units, had largely eliminated the Homeland Army (AK) and the other
anti-Communist guerrilla movements. According to the Polish historian Maria
Turlejska, the military tribunals set up by the Communist regime sentenced at
least 2,500 persons to death, most of whom were executed.20 Following the
1945 collapse of French and Japanese rule in Vietnam, the Communist-led Viet
15 Malcolm, Bosnia, p. 195.
16 Tibor Cseres, Titoist Atrocities in Vojvodina 1944-1945. Serbian Vendetta in
Bacska (Buffalo-Toronto: Hunyadi Publishing, 1993), pp. 138-141.
17 Rüdiger Overmans, „Personelle Verluste der deutschen Bevölkerung durch Flucht und Vertreibung,” in
Dzieje Najnowsze Vol. 26 (1994), Issue 2, p. 60.
18 Isa Blumi, „The Politics of Culture and Power: The Roots of Hoxha’s Postwar State,” in East European
Quarterly Vol. 31 (September 1997), Issue 3, pp. 385-388; James O’Donnell, A Coming of Age. Albania under
Enver Hoxha
 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 12.
19 Nissan Oren, Revolution Administered. Agrarianism and Communism in Bulgaria (Baltimore-London:
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), pp. 79-80; Tzvetan Todorov, Voices from the Gulag. Life and
Death in Communist Bulgaria (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), pp. 38-42.
20 Szokolay Katalin, Lengyelorszag tortenete (Budapest: Balassi Kiado, 1996), p. 206.
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Minh arrested tens of thousands of real or supposed collaborators, including
members of the Dai Viet Party and the Vietnam Nationalist Party. Of these
persons, „several thousand alleged enemies of the Revolution failed to survive
abductions of this kind in late August and September.”21
     Nevertheless, this type of mass violence was not characteristic of every
Communist regime established in the wake of World War II. By and large, the
East German, Czechoslovak, Hungarian, and Romanian Communist parties
refrained from that particular method, though in other respects their policies
proved repressive enough. Nor did the North Korean regime resort to mass
executions in the 1945-1949 period; the outbreak of the Korean War, however,
led to a sharp increase in the number of politically motivated executions and
murders.22 To be sure, a few atrocities of this kind, while restricted in number,
did take place in every country. In the spring of 1945 the self-appointed
’Communist’ authorities of the Hungarian district of Gyomro (mostly men who
had supported the short-lived Soviet Republic in 1919 but lost their contacts
with the Communist party afterwards) tortured and murdered at least 18 alleged
’reactionaries,’ including an anti-Fascist aristocrat who had recently got a safe-
conduct from Rakosi, the supreme leader of the Hungarian Communist Party.23
The leaders of these East European parties often found it difficult to hold the
radicalism of lower-level cadres and rank-and-file party members in check.
Many German Communists, who had spent the war years in the underground,
or in Nazi concentration camps and prisons, thought that there was no need to
cooperate with other anti-Fascist parties. „Some local communists began the
collectivization of agriculture; others … set up Soviets of Workers’ and Peasants’
Deputies.”24 Still, the overall picture of Communist policies in these five
countries did not include the mass execution of political opponents belonging
to the majority ethnic group, though the German and Hungarian minorities in
Czechoslovakia and Romania did suffer such atrocities at the hands of various
(Communist and non-Communist) armed groups. (For instance, in the town of
Presov 265 Germans, including 120 women and 4 children, were executed on
the order of a Czechoslovak lieutenant in June 1945.25) Characteristically, the
21 David G. Marr, Vietnam 1945. The Quest for Power (Berkeley-Los Angeles-London: University of
California Press, 1995), pp. 234-237, 518-519.
22 Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 12 December 1955, XIX-J-1-j [Top Secret Documents]
Korea 1945-1964 [henceforth KTS], 6. doboz, 5/cb, 00603/1956.
23 Palasik Maria, „A gyomroi gyilkossagok es kovetkezmenyeik, 1945-46,” in
Valoság Vol. 38 (April 1995), Issue 4, pp. 58-61.
24 Norman M. Naimark, The Russians in Germany. A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-
1949 (Cambridge [Mass.]-London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 254-256.
25 A.F. Noskova, „Migration of the Germans after the Second World War: Political and Psychological Aspects,”
in Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics Vol. 16 (March/June 2000), No. 1-2, p. 108.
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Polish and Bulgarian regimes established labor camps as early as 1944-1945,
whereas Czechoslovakia and Romania followed suit only in 1948-1949.
     Whence this difference? The political traditions of the countries in question
seem to have played a limited role in these events. The Antonescu, Sztojay, and
Szalasi regimes committed far more crimes against humanity than the Bulgarian
governments, and the Romanian intelligentsia was much more influenced by
the ideas of the extreme right than its Bulgarian counterpart. While both
Budapest and Bucharest participated in Hitler’s war against the USSR, Sofia
did not. Nevertheless, the Bulgarian purges of 1944-1945 proved far more
violent than the ones carried out by the Hungarian and Romanian Communists.
In Hungary and Bulgaria the number of persons executed for war crimes and
crimes against humanity stood at 146 and 2,700 respectively. According to
official data, in East Germany the Soviet authorities sentenced 12,807 members
of various Nazi organizations, of whom 118 received the death sentence.26 Most
probably, the dissimilarities described above resulted primarily from the different
strength of the various Communist resistance movements. As indicated before,
only the Yugoslav, Albanian, Bulgarian, Polish, and Vietnamese Communist
parties possessed a considerable armed force at the end of the war, and it was
precisely these parties which carried out thousands of executions in 1944-1948.
A thirst for revenge often seems to have played a role in the atrocities in question.
For instance, of the 12,000 members the Yugoslav CP had had in 1941, three-
fourths perished in the war.27 In addition, the Yugoslav, Albanian, Polish, and
Vietnamese anti-Communist opposition (e.g. the Chetniks, the Balli Kombetar,
the AK, the Cao Dai, and the Hoa Hao) also could rely on armed groups – a
factor that certainly shaped the characteristics of the conflict.
     These facts seem to indicate that the mass executions described above should
be put into the context of what one may term ’post-occupation violence.’
Liberation from Fascist rule unleashed political passions in many countries,
and the perpetrators of post-occupation violence – usually members of resistance
organizations – were not necessarily Communists. According to data compiled
by the French government, more than 4,000 collaborators were executed by
maquisards in France during and after the Liberation.28 In Italy some 12-15,000
people died between April and June 1945 as the partisans revenged themselves
on ex-Fascists.29 In Greece the Communist-led ELAS/EAM also executed a
26 Hermann Weber, Die DDR 1945-1990 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1993), p. 10.
27 Ridley, Tito, pp. 254-257.
28 Peter Novick, The Resistance Versus Vichy. The Purge of Collaborators in Liberated France (London:
Chatto and Windus Ltd., 1968), pp.204-206.
29 David Travis, „Communism and resistance in Italy, 1943-8,” in  Resistance and Revolution in
Mediterranean. Europe 1939-1948. Edited by Tony Judt (London-New York: Routledge, 1989), p. 99.
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number of armed ex-collaborators without trial in 1944. This wave of violence
was soon followed by a „white terror.”30 Disregarding the Varkiza Agreement of
February 1945, the National Guard and various paramilitary groups killed over
1,200 leftists that year. „Over eighty thousand people were prosecuted during
1945, the overwhelming majority belonging to the Left.”31 The expulsion of the
Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia resulted in some 30,000 deaths.32
Significantly, it was not only the local Communist parties which demanded the
deportation of the Germans from Czechoslovakia and Poland. The exile
governments in London, as well as several non-Communist parties active at home,
similarly endorsed the demands for expulsion.33 In Hungary certain parties, e.g.
the Social Democrats, condemned the principle of indiscriminate deportation,
but several anti-Communist democrats, such as the General Secretary of the
National Peasant Party, pressed for the expulsion of the whole German minority.34
     That is, the arbitrary execution of political opponents was not solely a
Communist method. On the other hand, the targets of the Yugoslav, Albanian,
Bulgarian, and Polish CPs included not only Fascists and collaborators (as it
was the case in France and Italy) but also anti-Communist democrats and
individuals who merely belonged to social strata which the Communists regarded
as ’exploitative.’ These acts of repression demonstrated how little these parties
were inclined to subject themselves to the rules of democracy. Still, the policies
of the Communist resistance movements lacked a uniform pattern. While in
Bulgaria and Vietnam the various non-Communist groups did not play a
significant role in the Resistance, in Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, and Poland
the Communist and non-Communist guerrillas proved, by and large, incapable
of cooperating with each other. In fact, armed clashes between the CPY and the
Chetniks, or between ELAS and EDES, began as early as 1942-1943.35
30 David H. Close, Greece since 1945: Politics, Economy, and Society (London: Pearson Education Limited,
2002), 13, 19-20.
31 Mark Mazover, „The Cold War and the Appropriation of Memory: Greece after Liberation,” in The
Politics of Retribution in Europe. World War II and Its Aftermath. Edited by Istvan Deak, Jan T. Gross, and
Tony Judt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 214-215.
32 Eagle Glassheim, „National Mythologies and Ethnic Cleansing: The Expulsion of Czechoslovak Germans
in 1945,” in Central European History Vol. 33 (2000), No. 4, p. 475.
33 Noskova, „Migration of the Germans after the Second World War,” p. 105; Philipp Ther, Deutsche und
polnische Vertriebene. Gesellschaft und Vertriebenenpolitik in der SBZ/DDR und in Polen 1945-1956
(Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998), pp. 37, 49.
34 Feher Istvan, A magyarorszagi nemetek kitelepitese 1945-1950 (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1988),
pp. 24-27.
35 Ole L. Smith, „’The First Round’ – Civil War during the Occupation,” in The Greek Civil War, 1943-
1950. Studies of polarization. Edited by David H. Close (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 60-65; Mark Wheeler,
„Pariahs to partisans to power: the Communist Party of Yugoslavia,” in Resistance and Revolution in
Mediterranean Europe 1939-1948, pp. 132-136
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Characteristically, all six countries would experience some sort of civil war in
1944-1948. On the other hand, the Italian, Belgian, and Slovak partisan
movements were based on the close cooperation of Communists and non-
Communists, which manifested itself in the creation of common organizations.36
Relations between the Gaullist AS and the Communist FTP proved cooler, but
the French Resistance also managed to avoid internecine conflict. In addition
to the essential difference betwen the „Italian” and the „Greek approach” (as
the PCI put it at the end of 194437), there were other dissimilarities as well.
„With its broad patriotic and democratic programme during the occupation,
EAM attracted professional people, including many army officers; some bishops
with many parish priests; many shopkeepers; and some merchants and industrial
employers.”38 By contrast, at the end of 1941 and in the spring of 1942 the
CPY pursued ultra-radical policies in Montenegro and Hercegovina, shooting
’kulaks,’ desecrating churches, and planning the establishment of soviets and
kolkozy.39
      The absence of uniformity in wartime Communist resistance questions the
validity of those interpretations which consider the policies of these parties
simply the reflection of contemporary Soviet foreign policy.40 To be sure, Stalin
did his best to create broad anti-Fascist alliances and guerrilla movements in
every Nazi-occupied country, and he resurrected the idea of ’Popular Fronts’
(renamed as ’National Fronts’) in order to achieve this aim. Still, the conception
worked less perfectly in certain countries than in others. In Yugoslavia, Greece,
Albania, and Poland the Communist parties had been repressed in the interwar
era, and their policies were regarded (not without justification) as opposed to
the territorial integrity and national interests of the countries in question (see
the conflicts over Greek Macedonia, Kosovo, Western Belarusia and Ukraine,
and so on). The proximity of the USSR also gave cause for fears of Communist
domination. The divisions these factors had created between Communist and
non-Communist resistance movements could not be easily overcome by any
new Soviet directive. By contrast, in Western Europe the CPs had profited
36 See, among others, David W. Ellwood, Italy 1943-1945 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1985),
pp. 76-79; Geert van Istendael, A belga labirintus, avagy a formatlansag baja (Budapest: Gondolat Konyvkiado,
1994), pp. 54-55; Eugen Steiner, The Slovak Dilemma (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp.
51-63.
37 Ellwood, Italy 1943-1945, p. 159.
38 David H. Close, „Introduction,” in The Greek Civil War, 1943-1950, pp. 16-19.
39 Ivo Banac, With Stalin against Tito. Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism  (Ithaca-London:
Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 81-82.
40 See, among others, Eduard Mark, „Revolution by Degrees: Stalin’s National Front Strategy for Europe,
1941-1947.” Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 31 (February 2001), pp. 7-19.
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from parliamentary democracy and from the geographical distance between
that region and the USSR. During World War II, as Alfred J. Rieber notes, the
local Communist parties „often took divergent paths not only from one another
but even from the general line of the united front as Moscow defined it both in
public announcements and in clandestine messages. At the end of the war the
Foreign Department of the Central Committee was forced to acknowledge that
contacts with foreign communist parties were wholly inadequate and had ’an
episodic character’.”41 The Soviets, on their part, seem to have laid a greater
emphasis on the creation of successful partisan movements than on the
establishment of effective National Fronts. Due to Soviet pressure, the Bulgarian
Communists launched a guerrilla campaign in 1941, though they could not
count on the support of non-Communist groups, and their activity did not prove
particularly popular.42 „By the spring of 1942 the Yugoslav partisans were being
held up as a model and all other resistance movements urged [by Moscow] to
follow their lead,”43 albeit their ultra-leftist policies were „completely out of
tune with the Soviet position.”44
     The Soviets, motivated by tactical and other considerations, often seem to
have disagreed with the ultra-leftist ideas of certain CPs. For instance, in 1944
Moscow reproached the Polish and Bulgarian Communists for having taken
„certain excessively radical measures” which might have jeopardized the aims
of Soviet foreign policy.45 In the 1942-1948 period the Kremlin persistently
warned Tito against pursuing ultra-leftist domestic and foreign policies, but
most of its warnings went unheeded.46 The East German Communist leader
Ulbricht „wanted major show trials of Nazi capitalists, but the Soviets vetoed
his idea, arguing that show trials would cause unnecessary turmoil among the
Germans.”47 The bloodless character of the North Korean land reform, which
otherwise resembled Chinese Communist land reform campaigns, may also
have resulted from Soviet directives. These episodes reveal that the subsequent
repressive policies of the East European Stalinist regimes should not be regarded
solely as the consequence of Soviet pressure, for many local Communist leaders
41 Alfred J. Rieber, „Soviet Planning for Post-War East-Central Europe,” in CEU History Department
Yearbook, 1997-1998. Edited by Eszter Andor, Andrea Peto, and Istvan Gyorgy Toth (Budapest: Central European
University, 1999), pp. 78-79.
42 Marshall Lee Miller, Bulgaria during the Second World War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975),
pp. 62-63, 195-200.
43 Geoffrey Swain, „The Comintern and southern Europe, 1938-43,” in Resistance and Revolution in
Mediterranean Europe 1939-1948, p. 39.
44 Banac, With Stalin against Tito, 82.
45 Mark, „Revolution by Degrees,” pp. 20-22, 31-33.
46 See, among others, Banac, With Stalin against Tito, pp. 9-42.
47 Naimark, The Russians in Germany, p. 361.
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and cadres were more than ready to resort to such measures. On the other hand,
the human losses caused by direct Soviet interventions often offset the (relative
and temporary) moderation the Kremlin thrust down the throat of the East
European Communist parties. According to official Soviet documents, 42,889
Germans (probably more) died in Sachsenhausen, Bautzen, and other
concentration camps run by the Soviet occupation authorities. That is, more
than a third of the internees lost their lives.48 Some 1,5 million people, over an
eighth of the local population, were deported by the Soviet regime from newly-
occupied Western Ukraine and Western Belarusia, and at least 21,857 Poles
were executed as a result of a Politburo resolution passed in March 1940.49
Approx. 600,000 Hungarians (370,000 POWs and 230,000 civilians) were taken
to the Soviet Union in 1941-1945, of whom at least 180,000 died en route or in
the GULAG.50 If a local Communist party lacked the necessary armed force,
the Soviets often filled the gap. Since the Slovak guerrilla movement had been
badly mauled by the Germans, it was the Soviet security service that arrested
some 10,000 real and alleged supporters of the Tiso regime.51 Generally
speaking, both partisan takeovers and direct Soviet interventions claimed more
lives than the policies of the imposed Stalinist  dictatorships.
     The question of whether Stalin had planned the ’Communization’ of the
occupied East European countries from the outset has been the subject of many
debates. A number of historians rightly point out that Soviet thinking on Germany
lacked a consistent logic, and emphasize that Moscow initially wished continued
cooperation with the Western powers.52 „Only after the proclamation of the
Marshall Plan in June 1947 did they [the Soviet leaders] decide to consolidate
their conquests” and establish Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, Vladislav
M. Zubok says.53 Stalin, however, seems to have laid a greater emphasis on
avoiding a confrontation with the West than on the preservation of democracy
in East-central and South-east Europe – an important difference. Soviet foreign
policy was thinking in spheres of interest, and since Stalin allowed the British
48 Naimark, The Russians in Germany, pp. 376-378, 385-388.
49 Stephen Wheatcroft, „The Scale and Nature of German and Soviet Repression and Mass Killings, 1930-
45,” in Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 48 (December 1996), Issue 8, p. 1344.
50 Stark Tamas, „Magyarorszag haborus embervesztesege,” in Rubicon Vol. 11 (2000), No. 103, p. 48.
51 Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia. The Struggle for Survival (Houndmills-London: Macmillan
Press Ltd., 1995), p. 226.
52 See, among others, Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1996); Naimark, The Russians in Germany, pp. 9-10, 465-467; and Vladislav M.
Zubok, „Soviet Activities in Europe after World War II,” in Problems of Post-Communism Vol. 42 (September/
October 1995), Issue 5, pp. 3-8.
53 Zubok, „Soviet Activities in Europe after World War II,” p. 6.
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a free hand in Greece, he expected the Western powers to tolerate Soviet rule
over Eastern Europe. „To ask whether Stalin pursued communist revolution in
Europe or continued cooperation with his allies is to pose a false antinomy,”
Eduard Mark correctly notes. „He wanted both.”54 Nevertheless, he overlooks
that the term ’National Front’ had a very different meaning in Western and
Eastern Europe. Far from the protective umbrella of Soviet troops, the West
European CPs were compelled to think in parliamentary politics. By contrast,
the early repressive policies of the East European Communist parties may be
regarded as an indicator of long-term Soviet goals, or at least a factor decisively
influencing the outcome of events. As the saying goes: One cannot make eggs
out of an omelette.
     Following the bloody and indiscriminate purges of 1944-1945, it was less
than likely that the Bulgarian Communists would respect the rules of democracy,
and the persecution of AK members was hardly an auspicious start for Polish
parliamentarianism. In occupied Germany the „most serious targets” of Soviet
repression were not conservatives or ex-Nazis but Social Democrats, though
the latter theoretically constituted a part of the anti-Fascist coalition.55 The
existence of a ’genuine coalition’ in Hungary did not prevent the Communist-
dominated political police from keeping a number of non-Communist ministers
and under-secretaries under surveillance as early as November 1945. It arrested
Demeny, the leader of a ’dissident’ Communist movement, right after the
liberation of Budapest. (He would be released only in October 1956.)56 While
the Communist leadership had not been involved in the political murders
committed in Gyomro, it successfully blocked every attempt to prosecute the
perpetrators.57 It was only Czechoslovakia where the issue of the Marshall Plan
seems to have produced a decisive effect on Communist policies. In 1945-
1946 the Czechoslovak CP, satisfied with its dominance in the parliament, did
not resort to blatantly anti-democratic measures. In November 1947, however,
the security service ’revealed’ a ’conspiracy’ in order to weaken the positions
of Slovakia’s largest political group, the Democratic Party.58
     By contrast, in Finland events took a different course from the very beginning.
Finland was not occupied by the USSR, and in 1944 the Soviets did not support
the establishing of „a popular volunteer movement to expel the Germans. Thus
54 Mark, „Revolution by Degrees,” pp. 5-7.
55 Naimark, The Russians in Germany, pp. 386-387.
56 Gyarmati Gyorgy, „A politika rendorsege a Rakosi-korszakban,” in Rubicon Vol. 12 (2001), Issue 3, pp.
4-5.
57 Palasik Maria, „A gyomroi gyilkossagok es kovetkezmenyeik, 1945-46,” pp. 63-65.
58 Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia, pp. 229-230.
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there was no opportunity in Finland … for the emergence of an anti-Fascist
resistance front of the kind that led to Communist alliances with Social
Democrats and the liberal bourgeoisie elsewhere among the warring countries
of Europe.” The trials of Ryti and other politicians held responsible for Helsinki’s
participation in World War II ended, despite Soviet interference, with sentences
„much lighter than those passed in corresponding post-war political trials in
both the East and the West.” In contrast with Hungary or Romania, the Soviet-
dominated Allied Control Commission did not interfere with the Finnish media.
The Finnish Communists gained a quarter of parliamentary seats in the 1945
election, and, thanks to their hold over the Ministry of the Interior, they managed
to infiltrate the security service and the police. Nonetheless, the foundations of
the democratic system remained essentially intact in the 1945-1947 period (as
opposed to the East European countries, the army was beyond Communist
control), which helps to explain why the radical elements of the party failed to
stage a coup in 1948. Moscow, on its part, proved more interested in a Soviet-
Finnish treaty than in a political upheaval in Finland.59 Thus the fate of both
Finland and Eastern Europe seems to have been decided as early as 1944-
1945.
High Noon: Eastern Europe in 1948-1953
    It is a widely held view that the wave of the East European party purges was
triggered by the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict, and the repressive policies of these
regimes simply duplicated the Soviet model. In other words, the main objective
of the purges was the establishment of Soviet control over the local Communist
parties. This interpretation is certainly reasonable, but it covers only a part of
the truth. For instance, some East European party leaders and cadres were tried,
or even executed, on fabricated charges well before 1948, the year of the Stalin-
Tito break.60 On the initiative of Yugoslav advisers, the Albanian party leadership
executed three prominent Communists (Lulo, Fundo, and Gjinishi) without trial
as early as 1944; Lulo and Gjinishi had been a Youth League leader and a
Politburo member respectively.61 In 1944 Gheorghiu-Dej accused Foris, then
59 Osmo Jussila, Seppo Hentila, and Jukka Nevakivi, From Grand Duchy to a Modern State. A Political
History of Finland since 1809 (London: Hurst & Company, 1999), pp. 227-236, 245-249.
60 Several standard works on Soviet-dominated East Europe, such as Zbigniew K. Brzezinski’s The Soviet
Bloc. Unity and Conflict (Cambridge [Mass.]-London: Harvard University Press, 1967), do not mention any
East European party leader purged in the 1944-1947 period.
61 George H. Hodos, Show Trials. Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe, 1948-1954 (New York-
Westport-London: Praeger Publishers, 1987), pp. 6-7.
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the General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, of having been a
police informant. As a consequence, Foris was replaced in the same year, and
killed without trial in 1946.62 Between 1947 and 1952 the Yugoslav regime
tried dozens of middle-level Communist officials, survivors of the Dachau and
Buchenwald concentration camps, and executed 11 of them. The victims were
subjected to torture in order to make them ’confess’ that they had been agents
of the Gestapo. At first it was the Soviet security service that provided Belgrade
with a list of ’suspects,’ but the Stalin-Tito conflict failed to put an end to the
’Dachau trials.’63 Although the confrontation between Moscow and Belgrade
certainly shaped the characteristics of the East European purges (this was
particularly obvious in Czechoslovakia64), the latter often had indigenous roots
as well.
     Moscow’s involvement probably extended the scope of the purges. From
1948 to 1953 Stalin played a decisive role in the selection of the victims, and it
was the Soviet advisers who taught the East European security services how to
organize show trials. Had the Soviets not participated in the purges, the victims
may have been liquidated without trial (as it was the case in pre-1933 Mongolia
and pre-1948 Albania). However, the relationship between the local dictators
and the Soviet advisers was not based on the subordination of the former to the
latter (as suggested by several authors). While the top Soviet leaders could
give the ’little Stalins’ instructions, the advisers could not. In Bulgaria Soviet
advisers Trifonov, Chernov, Petrov, and Filatov did maintain a close control
over the operation of the state security service, and they certainly had the power
to issue orders to the officials of the Ministry of the Interior, but the country’s
supreme leader, Chervenkov, remained beyond their reach. For instance, in
1952 Chervenkov had Filatov, who had attempted to unseat Minister of the
Interior Tsankov, recalled.65 In Hungary both Rakosi and the Soviet advisers
(Belkin and Makarov) played a crucial role in the organization of the Rajk
trial. When the Hungarian security organs proved incapable of extracting the
required confession from Rajk, Belkin’s team stepped in. Nevertheless, the
Hungarian dictator insisted on participating in the creation of the indictment.
62 Dennis Deletant, Communist Terror in Romania. Gheorghiu-Dej and the Police State, 1948-1965
(London: C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., 1999), pp. 29-33, 151-153.
63 Ivo Banac, With Stalin against Tito, p. 20; Bruno Heidlberger,
Jugoslawiens Auseinandersetzung mit dem Stalinismus. Historische Voraussetzungen und Konsequenten
(Frankfurt-am-Main: Verlag Peter Lang, 1989), pp. 243-244.
64 See, among others, Igor Lukes, „The Rudolf Slansky Affair: New Evidence,” in Slavic Review Vol. 58
(Spring 1999), No. 1, pp. 172-173.
65 Gospodinka Nikova, „The Blow against the State Leadership of Bulgaria (1949-1953),” in Bulgarian
Historical Review Vol. 25 (1997), No. 2-3, pp. 116-126.
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„We bitterly argue with each other,” Belkin told Hungarian security chief Péter.
„He [Rakosi] always wants more and more. It is never enough. Now he even
demands [to insert in the indictment] that Rajk wanted to kill Rakosi.”66
     In any case, the scale of repression was enormous everywhere in Eastern
Europe. With regard to the institutions and the targets of the terror, the various
dictatorships were rather similar. Still, certain regimes proved more oppressive
than others. In these years no East European leader questioned the universal
validity of Soviet experience, yet even the same policies, if applied on different
societies, could yield different results. As opposed to their East German
counterparts, the Czech Communists failed to create a new working-class
intelligentsia, since in Bohemia and Moravia working-class children „paid only
half-hearted attention to high school admissions… In Poland, Bulgaria, or even
Slovakia large numbers of peasants eagerly embarked upon higher education
and moved into the growing cities. In the Czech Lands, that sort of social
advancement had occurred generations earlier.”67 It is also worth comparing
the East European regimes with regard to the number of political prisoners.
Between 1944-1945 and 1953, some 12,000 persons passed through Bulgarian
labor camps. By contrast, in Poland 84,200 people (in proportion to the
population, more than twice as many as in Bulgaria) had similar experiences
between 1945 and 1954. While in Poland the number of imprisoned priests
stood at about 100, the Czechoslovak dictatorship sent as many as 2,000 priests
to labor camps. Both regimes imprisoned or interned prelates, such as Cardinal
Wyszynski, Archbishop Beran, and bishops Kaczmarek and Trochta, whereas
in East Germany no leading member of the Protestant church hierarchy went to
prison.68 As opposed to Hungary, where the dictatorship of Rakosi arrested
some 400 Social Democrats, in Gottwald’s Czechoslovakia over 7,000 members
of the Socialist Party were sentenced. In Hungary the number of political
prisoners stood at 7,093 in 1953, while Czechoslovak jails had held some 25,000
’politicals’ (proportionately, two and a half times as many as in Hungary) as
66 „Rakosi Matyas, Rajk-per, Peter Gabor (Dokumentumok. Kozzeteszi: Zinner Tibor),” in História Vol.
14 (1992), No. 5-6, pp. 58-59.
67 John Connelly, „Students, Workers, and Social Change: The Limits of Czech Stalinism,” in Slavic Review
Vol. 56 (Summer 1997), No. 2, pp. 308-333.
68 Elizabeth A. Clark, „Church-State Relations in the Czech Republic: Past Turmoil and Present
Transformation,” in Brigham Young University Law Review Vol. 1996 (1996), Issue 4, pp. 1019-1086; John S.
Conway, „The’Stasi’ and the Churches: Between Coercion and Compromise in East German Protestantism,
1949-1989,” in Journal of Church & State Vol. 36 (Autumn 1994), Issue 4, pp. 725-747; Andrzej Paczkowski,
Fel evszazad Lengyelorszag tortenetebol 1939-1989 (Budapest: 1956-os Intezet, 1997), p. 171; Andrzej
Paczkowski, „Poland, the ’Enemy Nation’,” in The Black Book of Communism. Crimes, Terror, Repression
(Cambridge [Mass.]-London: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 382; Todorov, Voices from the Gulag, pp.
38-42.
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early as 1949.69 These differences highlight the importance of local circumstances,
the variety of Soviet guidelines, and the personal responsibility of the East
European leaders. The adoption of the ’Soviet model,’ while undoubtedly a
decisive factor, does not explain every aspect of East European repression.
     The East European dictatorships did not copy the Soviet machinery of terror
in every respect, though the similarities remained substantial enough. For
instance, in the Soviet Union and Hungary ’de-kulakization’ affected some one
million and 72,000 families respectively. That is, the number of ’kulaks’ in
relation to the population proved somewhat higher in Hungary (a country of
9,205 million inhabitants in 1948) than in the USSR.70 On the other hand, the
similar number of targets was not necessarily accompanied by similar methods
of repression. In Hungary the total number of prisoners sentenced by civilian
and military courts, or interned by the authorities, stood at 41,639 on 1 April
1953, whereas in mid-June there were 7,093 political and 24,498 other prisoners
in the country. That time, Hungarian internment camps held 5,036 inmates.71
By contrast, in January 1939 there were slightly over two million prisoners (in
relation to the population, two and a half times as many persons) in Soviet
prisons, concentration camps, and forced labor colonies. Camp inmates
constituted some three-fifths of that figure, indicating that labor camps played
a much more important role in the USSR than in Hungary. Due to frequent
transfers to the GULAG, the Soviet prison population remained much less
constant within a year than its Hungarian counterpart. By contrast, both the
Hungarian prison population and the number of persons held in the GULAG
grew steadily.72 In 1950-1951 the Hungarian dictatorship deported 16,044
persons from the capital and the southern border region, whereas the number
of individuals the Soviet regime had exiled as ’kulaks’ was 1,803,392. That is,
the Soviet deportations of 1930-1931 alone affected, in proportion to the
population, six times as many persons as the Hungarian ones. Moreover, at
least 240,000 Soviet exiles died in 1932-1933 – a death rate incomparably
higher than its Hungarian counterpart.73
69 Karel Bartosek, „Central and Southeastern Europe,” in The Black Book of Communism, p. 405; Lukes,
„The Rudolf Slansky Affair: New Evidence,” p. 164; Punkosti Arpad, Rakosi a csucson 1948-1953 (Budapest:
Magyar Konyvklub, 1996), p. 293; Zinner Tibor, XX. szazadi politikai perek. A magyarorszagi eljarasok vazlata
1944/45-1992 (Budapest: Rejtjel Kiado, 1999), pp. 38-40.
70 Punkosti Arpad, Rakosi a csucson 1948-1953, p. 455; Lynne Viola, Peasant Rebels under Stalin.
Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance (New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 86.
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73 Punkosti, Rakosi a csucson 1948-1953, pp. 274, 397; Nicolas Werth, „A State against its People: Violence,
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     The most significant difference between Soviet and East European Stalinist
repression manifested itself in the number of executions. In Hungary some 500
individuals were executed for political reasons in the 1946-1956 period. From
1945 to 24 February 1951, 227 executions took place. Of the 227 persons in
question, 146 had been sentenced for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
While some of the latter verdicts lacked a proper justification, others did not.74
The scale of executions proved quite similar in the other East European
countries: 178 in Czechoslovakia between October 1948 and the end of 1952,
137 in Romania from 1945 to 1964, and 20 in Poland between 1950 and 1953.75
These figures, in relation to the respective populations, were lower than the
annual average (approx. 1650-1700) of Soviet political executions in the 1932-
1936 and 1943-1953 periods, to say nothing of the Great Terror that led to the
execution of 681,692 individuals in two years.76 Significantly, the powers of
the Hungarian political police did not include the right to mete out death
sentences, though it could intern people (including persons acquitted by courts)
at will.77 By contrast, in the USSR 92,6 per cent of the death sentences handed
down in 1937-1938 were passed by troiki, that is, without usual judicial
procedure.78 In Hungary a decree passed in May 1945 authorized People’s Courts
to sentence persons over 16 to death, whereas in April 1935 the Soviet Politburo
had extended the death penalty to „young criminals, from the age of 12
upward.”79 In addition, the CPSU suffered much heavier losses due to the purges
than its Hungarian counterpart. Of the 1,5 million people arrested in 1937-
1938, some 122,000 had belonged to the party. In Leningrad over 90 per cent
of the party cadres were arrested.80 By contrast, the total number of Hungarian
Communist and Social Democratic party members affected by the political
trials did not exceed 430, that is, one per cent of those sentenced for political
reasons in the 1946-1956 period.81
74 Laszlo Karsai, „The People’s Courts and Revolutionary Justice in Hungary, 1945-46,” in The Politics of
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     The relative „mildness” of the East European dictators by no means stemmed
from any fundamental difference between Stalin’s worldview and theirs. These
leaders were as inclined to believe in the ubiquitousness of the ’enemy’ as the
Soviet tyrant had been. By 1953 the Polish political police had files on a third
of the adult population.82 In 1951 the Bulgarian regime arrested almost all
military generals (the majority of them would be released before Stalin’s death,
however).83 A  Hungarian investigation carried out in 1949 concluded that some
40 per cent of state security officers, who had played an indispensable role in
the establishment of the regime, were ’unreliable.’ Commenting on the high
percentage of ’unreliable elements’ among lower-level state and party cadres,
Rakosi grumbled: „We have inherited such a proletariat… the whole population
must be remoulded. Only a small part of it can be put in prison.”84 The post-
1948 East European dictatorships did not resort to mass executions in order to
deal with that alleged ’threat,’ however. By contrast, as indicated before, the
Choibalsan regime had slaughtered tens of thousands in a country of less than
one million inhabitants. Had Rakosi carried out a comparable purge, he would
have executed over 100,000 people. The difference is all the more striking
since both the Mongolian and the East European regimes were closely controlled
by Moscow.
     One may explain that obvious dissimilarity by highlighting the peculiarity
of Mongolian and Russian political traditions. In fact, East European traditions
may have played a certain role in the absence of mass executions. Rakosi kept
saying that had Hungary had a Siberia, it would have been much easier to
liquidate the ’class enemy.’85 It is also significant that the purge of
’Cominformists,’ carried out by the Tito regime in 1948-1951, rarely resulted
in liquidations, though most of the sentences had been passed by the security
service instead of regular civilian or military courts.86 Nevertheless, it should
be pointed out that neither Stalin nor Choibalsan returned to the policy of mass
slaughter in the post-1945 years. The number of Soviet political executions
underwent a sharp decline after the Great Terror (from 328,618 in 1938 to
2,552 in 1939). Between 1943 and 1953 the annual average of such executions
was not significantly higher than in the 1932-1936 period (and it was lower
than in the period between 1921 and 1929), though several prominent party
leaders (Voznesensky, Kuznetsov, Rodionov, Soloviev, and others) perished in
82 Paczkowski, „Poland, the ’Enemy Nation’,” p. 382.
83 Nikova, „The Blow against the State Leadership of Bulgaria (1949-1953),” pp. 125-126.
84 Punkosti, Rakosi a csucson 1948-1953, pp. 120, 370.
85 Ibid., p. 235.
86 Banac, With Stalin against Tito, pp. 121, 245-247.
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Stalin’s postwar purges. A possible explanation is that the repressive policies
of the satellite regimes more or less followed the dynamic of Soviet executions.
The exceptional severity of the Mongolian purges had resulted from their
coincidence with the Great Terror, while the East European dictatorships’ model
was Stalin’s post-1945 ’selective repression’ (that is, the execution of high-
ranking leaders was not accompanied by the mass slaughter of cadres and
ordinary citizens). In other words, the East European regimes did not duplicate
each stage of development the USSR had gone through between 1927 and
1953 but copied a particular form of Stalinism. This seems to indicate that
Stalin, as suggested by Gábor T. Rittersporn, sometimes proved capable of
learning from his blunders.
     According to Rittersporn, the Soviet leadership recognized that the mass
executions of 1937-1938 had failed to solve any political or economic problem.87
While this interpretation may not be completely correct, it is worth recalling a
conversation that took place between Stalin and Chervenkov in January 1951.
The Soviet dictator „advised the Bulgarian leaders not to carry out a
dispossession of the kulaks, not to copy blindly the Soviet experience of the
30s and to artificially heighten the tension in the country.”88 (As a consequence,
Sofia would temporarily slacken the pace of collectivization.) Significantly,
both the East European and the Asian Communist dictatorships carried out the
collectivization of agriculture in several stages. At first peasants were grouped
into lower-level (Type I) cooperatives, then into intermediate (Type II) ones,
and finally into higher-level (Type III and IV) farms.89 This had not been the
case in the Soviet Union, however. In 1929 the Soviet regime did not give its
cadres exact instructions on how to establish co-ops; the main goal of this
strategy may have been „to get local cadres pushing for the absolute maximum,
thus providing both quick results and information on what the attainable
maximum actually was.”90 The various negative experiences gained in these
years seem to have convinced Stalin of the advantages of gradualism. Thus it is
not impossible that the Great Terror was also critically re-examined by the
Soviet dictator. To be sure, neither the practice of political executions nor the
87 Rittersporn, „A terror,” p. 33.
88 Vladimir Migev, „The Bulgarian Peasants’ Resistance to Collectivization (1948-1958),” in Bulgarian
Historical Review Vol. 25 (1997), Issue 1, pp. 62-63.
89 See, among others, Karl-Eugen Waedekin, Agrarian Policies in Communist Europe. A Critical
Introduction (The Hague-London: Allanheld, Osmun and Martinus Nijhoff, Publishers, 1982), pp. 38-39; Dali
L. Yang, Calamity and Reform in China. State, Rural Society, and Institutional Change Since the Great Leap
Famine (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), pp. 24-31.
90 Sheila Fitzpatrick, Stalin’s Peasants. Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village after Collectivization
(New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 49-50.
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maintenance of labor camps came to an end. Both forms of repression would
be also characteristic of the East European regimes. Therefore, one may conclude
that the latter methods constituted a more integral part of Stalinism than the
Great Purges. The mass terror of 1937-1938 was not necessarily a logical
consequence of ’Bolshevik mentality.’ Political paranoia was as widespread in
Eastern Europe as it had been the Soviet Union, yet the witch-hunt carried out
by the ’little Stalins’ did not culminate in the execution of tens of thousands.
However, this fact highlights, rather than diminishes, Stalin’s personal
responsibility for the Great Terror.
 A Case Study: North Korea
     As Bruce Cumings points out, the North Korean dictatorship of Kim Il-sung
has been (and still is) frequently characterized as an Asian copy of Soviet
Stalinism.91 True, Soviet influence on the development of North Korean political
and judicial institutions was substantial in the first decade of the regime. For
instance, the Hungarian diplomats accredited to the DPRK found the structure
of the North Korean judicial organs (the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Public
Prosecutor’s Office, and so on) very similar to that of Hungarian ones. They
also noted that the North Korean criminal code had been written with the help
of Soviet advisers. Paradoxically, this dependency on Soviet expertise partly
resulted from the nationalist stance of the Kim Il-sung regime. Although
P’yongyang initially retained certain Japanese laws and many Japanese-trained
judges,92  the purge of ’pro-Japanese elements’ proved thorough enough. (By
contrast, the South Korean regime of Syngman Rhee continued to employ large
numbers of Japanese-trained police officers and officials.) In the mid-1950s
the extreme paucity of trained judges and attorneys still constituted a serious
problem. In the post-liberation period many ’politically reliable workers’ had
been appointed judges on the grounds that they would simultaneously receive
legal training through evening classes. Thus it was quite understandable that
the regime turned to the Soviets for legal expertise, though Korean traditions
also influenced North Korea’s constitution, criminal code, and legal system.
As the Hungarian diplomats noted in 1954, the authorities did not reckon the
beginning of one’s life from his birth (as it is the case in Europe) but from his
91 Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War II. The Roaring of the Cataract (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1990), pp. 291-294.
92 Charles K. Armstrong, „Surveillance and Punishment in Postliberation North Korea,” in East Asia Cultures
Critique Vol. 3 (Winter 1995), No. 3, pp. 701-703.
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conception; that is, a person born twenty years ago was officially registered as
twenty-one years old.  The limited financial resources of the North Korean
state sometimes retarded, rather than facilitated, the adoption of Soviet-style
institutions, and compelled the country’s rulers to seek alternative solutions.
For example, the unpaid self-defence and security forces P’yongyang established
in every village had no counterparts in most East European countries.93
     In North Korea the creation of a monolithic political structure was a
particularly rapid process. Like in the three South-east European countries,
Communist dominance had become undisputed by 1946. A government-
controlled Federation of Trade Unions came into existence as early as 30
November 1945, some two months after liberation. In January 1946 the North
Korean authorities merged the various youth leagues into a single organization,
while similar events would take place in Hungary only three years later. The
membership of this new organization was proportionally far greater than that
of the Komsomol. It had an unitary structure, while North Vietnam and China
established two youth leagues, one for devout Communists and another for
sympathizers. With the possible exception of Tito’s Yugoslavia, nowhere in
Europe did a leadership cult emerge as quickly as in North Korea. In 1946 the
regime named the country’s sole university for Kim Il-sung, and next year it set
up schools for the orphans of revolutionary martyrs in Man’gyongdae, the
dictator’s home village. By contrast, Rakosi, though hardly an opponent of
personality cult, never took comparable measures. Interestingly enough, the
quick establishment of one-party and one-man rule was not necessarily
accompanied with the similarly rapid adoption of Soviet economic policies. As
opposed to Eastern Europe, no agricultural collectivization took place in the
DPRK before 1953-1954, because P’yongyang did not want to alienate South
Korean public opinion.94 In other words, North Korea overtook most East
European regimes in the political field, but it lagged behind with regard to
collectivization. Since the Mongolian Communist regime (and its Soviet backers)
also placed greater emphasis on political monolithism than on economic
transformation, one may conclude that the political and economic components
93 Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 12 December 1955, KTS, 6. doboz, 5/cb, 00603/1956;
Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 12 July 1954, KTS, 6. doboz, 5/d, 00868/1/1954; Hungarian Embassy
to the DPRK, Report, 19 April 1953, XIX-J-1-k [Administrative Documents] Korea 1945-1964 [henceforth
KA], 4. doboz, 5/cg, 04629/1/1953.
94 Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 23 October 1958, KTS, 12. doboz, 27/a, 006458/1958;
Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 27 October 1951, KA, 9. doboz, 18/g, 01939/1952; Hungarian
Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 7 October 1953, KA, 6. doboz, 12/a, 011216/1953; Hungarian Embassy to the
DPRK, Report, 29 November 1956, KA, 6. doboz, 12/a, 1/25-5/1957; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK,
Report, 19 July 1952, KTS, 3. doboz, 4/bc, 001024/2/1952.
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of the Soviet model were relatively loosely connected with each other.
Nonetheless, this flexibility also meant (as indicated earlier) that the absence
of overt ’Communization’ was not a guarantee for political pluralism unless
the Communist parties proved willing to observe the rules of democracy. The
policies of the East German and North Vietnamese regimes also included the
temporary postponement of certain unpopular economic measures so as to
facilitate national unification, but such considerations did not prevent Pankow
and Hanoi from stamping out any meaningful opposition.
     In contrast with most East European countries, the 1948 purge of O Ki-sop
and other North Korean ’domestic Communists’ did not result in show trials
which might have produced a negative effect on South Korean public opinion.
(The Ulbricht regime similarly refrained from staging such trials in order not
to jeopardize the cause of German unification.) The outcome of the largest
shake-up the Korean Workers’ Party experienced in Stalin’s lifetime also differed
substantially from that of the East European purges. The 3rd CC plenum, held in
December 1950, launched a campaign against party members who had behaved
passively under the brief period of US and South Korean occupation. Of the
700,000 KWP members, some 500,000 were disciplined. Kim Il-sung expelled a
number of generals and other high-ranking officers from the Korean People’s
Army for ’defeatism,’ i.e. for highlighting US superiority in the air. The purge did
not spare the Kapsan faction, Kim Il-sung’s trusted lieutenants, either. At the 3rd
plenum the dictator personally pointed out how many ’crimes’ Kim Il had
committed, and several other influential Kapsan men were also relieved of their
positions. Most probably, it was the very magnitude of the purge that led to a
development not characteristic of the 1948-1953 policies of the East European
’people’s democracies’95 but usually associated with de-Stalinization. At the 4th
CC plenum, held in November 1951, the leadership officially condemned ’leftist
deviations,’ and readmitted some 30 per cent of the expelled party members.
Realizing that he had gone into overdrive, Kim Il-sung blamed the ’excesses’ on
his chief Soviet Korean rival, Ho Ka-i. With the notable exception of Mu Chong,
the leaders purged in December 1950 were reinstated.96
95 In the Soviet Union, following the CC plenum held in June 1936, „substantial numbers of expelled rank-
and-file members were readmitted on appeal. But most were not.” Getty and Naumov, The Road to Terror, p.
240. As opposed to the North Korean case, demoted high-ranking Soviet leaders were usually unable to regain
their lost positions.
96 Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 22 October 1952, KA, 11. doboz, 27/a, 012603/1952;
Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 21 March 1953, KTS, 5. doboz, 5/c, 00338/2/1953; Hungarian
Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 8 June 1961, KTS, 13. doboz, 27/e, 003643/1/1961. See also Robert A. Scalapino
and Chong-sik Lee, Communism in Korea II. The Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp.
456-457; Dae-Sook Suh, Kim Il-sung. The North Korean Leader (New York: Columbia University Press,
1988), pp. 122-126.
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     Paradoxically, the only classical show trial the North Korean leadership has
ever staged took place after Stalin’s death. Nevertheless, the trial of Yi Sung-
yop and other party leaders of South Korean origin seems to have been organized
with the assistance of Soviet, or at least Soviet-trained, security officers. In
contrast with the 1950-1951 shake-up, but similarly to the events which had
happened in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia in 1948-1952, the purge
did not strike the principal targets first but evolved gradually. Its first victim,
the poet Yim Hwa was arrested in the fall of 1952. He may have been chosen
for a role similar to the one Kiril Slavov, Noel Field, and Tibor Szõnyi had had
to play in Sofia and Budapest respectively. That is, his interrogators used his
forced confessions to implicate high-ranking party leaders in the ’plot’ he had
allegedly concocted. At the 5th CC plenum, held in December, Kim Il-sung
made an attack on ’factional elements.’ In the winter of 1952-1953 the purge
swept various ministries, and in the spring of 1953 it was extended to the Youth
League. On January 26th Foreign Minister Pak Hon-yong, the head of the South
Korean Workers’ Party, was interrupted and corrected by his deputy, Yi Tong-
gon in the presence of foreign diplomats, indicating the former’s coming
demotion. In March Kim Il-sung had Yi Sung-yop and other SKWP leaders
arrested. Their trial took place in August, while Pak Hon-yong, also arrested in
March 1953, was executed as late as 1955. Thus the framework of the purge
did not differ much from the East European show trials, but it still had a Korean
touch. The dividing line between East European ’domestic Communists’ and
their ’Muscovite’ rivals proved more blurred than the one between South and
North Korean Communists. For instance, North and South Korean Communist
writers fiercely quarreled over the issue of standard language. While the first
group intended to base standard Korean on the P’yongyang dialect, the second
favored the Seoul dialect. These debates had become so embittered, the
Hungarian diplomats noted, that writers of southern origin were most unwilling
to accept any novel written by a northern author as a literary work, and vice
versa. Thus the victims of the 1952-1953 purge belonged to a rather identifiable
group, whereas the ties between Trotsky and Bukharin had existed merely in
the imagination of Stalin and Vyshinsky.97
     By 1956 Kim Il-sung had already purged several of his influential Soviet
and Yan’an Korean rivals (Mu Chong, Ho Ka-i, Pak Il-u, and others), and in
97 Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 20 March 1953, KTS, 10. doboz, 24/b, 00808/1953; Hungarian
Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 21 March 1953, KTS, 5. doboz, 5/c, 00338/2/1953; Hungarian Embassy to the
DPRK, Report, 30 April 1953, KA, 11. doboz, 27/a, 04648/2/1953; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report,
15 April 1954, KTS, 4. doboz, 5/a, 00866/1954. See also Brian Myers, Han Sorya and North Korean Literature.
The Failure of Socialist Realism in the DPRK (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1994), pp. 84-85.
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1957-1959 he broke the power of both factions once and for all. The function
and importance of the latter campaign was comparable to the attack Stalin had
launched on the intra-party opposition in 1926-1928, and even to the Great
Terror of 1937-1938, but its methods proved rather different. First of all, the
number of party members expelled between July 1957 and July 1958 did not
exceed 4,000, i.e. less than one per cent of the total membership.98 By contrast,
the Soviet proverka of 1935 had resulted in the expulsion of 9,1 per cent of
party members.99 On the other hand, the enforced participation of the whole
membership in the screening process certainly filled each KWP member with
fear and a sense of insecurity. While Soviet proverki and chistki had been carried
out by the party committees and the security organs, in the DPRK party members,
assembled in groups, had to practise criticism and self-criticism. If a person
proved unable to name two witnesses testifying that he had not been involved
in any anti-regime acivity since the outbreak of the Korean War, his self-criticism
would not be accepted. Since one was prohibited from naming relatives, friends,
or acquaintances as his witnesses, the psychological pressure thus created
became extremely intense. In the second half of 1958 the regime purged the
provincial party committees and People’s Committees, replacing most of their
chairmen, and at the end of the year it organized a public trial in each province.
The courts usually meted out death sentences (executions were also public),
and in some cases the incited audience beat the accused unconscious.100
     The methods enumerated above had more in common with Maoist practices
than with Soviet Stalinism. Nevertheless, the events that happened in North
Korea between 1957 and 1969 had a logic somewhat similar to that of the
Soviet purges of 1926-1938. In March 1959, following the campaign against
the ’foreign’ factions, the KWP was headed by a chairman (Kim Il-sung) and
three deputy chairmen (Pak Chong-ae, Pak Kum-ch’ol, and Kim Ch’ang-man).
Not counting Kim Il-sung, the Politburo was composed of nine full members
(Ch’oe Yong-gon, Pak Chong-ae, Kim Il, Pak Kum-ch’ol, Chong Il-yong, Yi
Hyo-sun, Yim Hae, Nam Il, and Kim Kwang-hyop) and four deputy members
(Yi Chong-ok, Han Sang-du, Kim Ik-son, and Ha Ang-ch’on).101 These persons
had faithfully supported Kim Il-sung vis-a-vis the Soviet and Yan’an factions,
yet only Ch’oe Yong-gon and Kim Il managed to keep their positions by 1970.
The twelve others had been purged during the 1960s, some of them temporarily,
98 I would like to thank Dr. Andrei N. Lankov for this piece of information.
99 Getty and Naumov, The Road to Terror, p. 198.
100 Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Annual Report, 24 February 1959, KTS, 4. doboz, 5/a, 002242/
1959; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 4 June 1959, KTS, 5. doboz, 5/ca, 003047/1/1959.
101 Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 30 March 1959, KTS, 5. doboz, 5/ca, 002821/1959.
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some for good. By contrast, from the 1970s on Kim Il-sung would rarely purge
Politburo members.102 Similarly, the chistki which took place in the Soviet Union
in the 1930s removed a substantial part of the cadre generation that had
supported Stalin in his 1926-1928 campaign against the intra-party opposition.
The terror peaked in 1937-38, and the number of executions, though it would
remain quite high until 1953, fell dramatically thereafter. One possible
interpretation of these events is that both dictators wanted to get rid of the
cadres whom they were indebted to for the latter’s previous support. Having
replaced this layer of the elite with another that was wholly dependent on them,
they may have concluded that certain repressive measures were no longer
necessary.
     In other respects, however, the replacement of „old” leaders by „new” ones
seems to have had a different logic in the two countries. The persons Kim
trusted most were the Korean members of the so-called 88th Brigade, i.e., those
Manchurian guerrillas who spent WW II in the USSR with him, such as Ch’oe
Yong-gon, Kim Il, Pak Song-ch’ol, Ch’oe Hyon, and O Chin-u. Very few of
them were removed for good, and from 1970 on they constantly dominated the
top party leadership. The next circle was made up of those men who had also
been associated with the Manchurian guerrilla movement but did not belong to
the 88th Brigade, like Pak Kum-ch’ol, Sok San, Kim Kwang-hyop, and Ho Bong-
hak. They also enjoyed a privileged position, but a quite high number of them
fell victim to the purges of 1967-1969. (By contrast, certain technocrats, such
as Chong Chun-t’aek, were consistently spared, but they never became as
influential as the members of the first circle.) The third circle was made up of
those Soviet, Yan’an, SKWP, and „domestic” leaders who took sides with Kim
Il-sung against the leaders of their factions, like Pang Hak-se, Nam Il, Kim
Ch’ang-man, and Ha Ang-ch’on. Partly due to the twists and turns of North
Korean foreign policy, their influence gradually declined after 1959, and some
of them were even purged. In the first years of Kim’s rule, former guerrillas
constituted only a quite small minority of the party leadership. By 1956, they
had become the strongest group, and in 1961 they already formed the majority.
Nonetheless, the positions of former Brigade members were still relatively weak:
of the twenty highest-ranking CC members, only three and five (including Kim
himself) belonged to that group in 1956 and 1961 respectively. By 1970 the
ex-guerrillas had become absolutely dominant, and of the top ten CC seats, as
many as seven were occupied by former Brigade members and the eighth was
102 Adrian Buzo, The Guerilla Dynasty. Politics and Leadership in North Korea (London-New York: I.B.
Tauris Publishers, 1999), pp. 53, 83.
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held by Kim Yong-ju, the dictator’s younger brother.103 From that time on,
Politburo purges noticeably abated: in 1994, when Kim Il-sung died, „it had
been seventeen years since the purge of Vice President Kim Tong-gyu in October
1977 – the last sudden, unexplained disappearance from public view of a senior
cadre.”104 That is, Kim Il-sung first reinforced the position of the ex-guerrillas
at the expense of all other groups, then ensured the dominance of former Brigade
members over other guerrillas. Having achieved this aim, the dictator did not
initiate any new large-scale shake-up. In addition, some leaders who lost their
Politburo membership in the 1960s, such as Yim Ch’un-ch’u and Yi Chong-ok,
were reappointed in the 1970s.
     The Soviet counterpart of the 88th Brigade was probably the „Stalinist kernel”
(a term coined by Graeme Gill), namely, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov,
Mikoian, Andreev, and the basically powerless Kalinin. These men consistently
supported Stalin at least from the mid-1920s on, and they managed to survive
every purge the dictator carried out. With the exception of Kalinin, who died of
illness, they actually outlived Stalin. However, the position of this group was
quite different from that of the 88th Brigade. While the latter’s members, with
very few exceptions, occupied only relatively marginal positions in the first
decade of Kim Il-sung’s rule and their obvious dominance began as late as
twenty-five years after Kim had assumed the party’s leadership, the men who
constituted the „Stalinist kernel” had joined the Politburo as early as before
July 1926. In other words, the Soviet purges which took place in the 1930s
cannot be regarded as a prerequisite for placing this group in the top leadership.
While the victims of the pre-1970 North Korean purges belonged to groups
which had come into existence before 1946, many of the CPSU Politburo and
CC members executed in 1937-1940, like Kosior, Chubar, Bauman, Rudzutak,
Postyshev, Eikhe, and Ezhov, had nothing to do with the groups Stalin had
subdued in 1923-1929. On the contrary, they often played an active role in the
struggle against the aforesaid factions, and they owed their advancement entirely
to the dictator. Still, they proved particularly vulnerable. Of the ten men who
joined the Politburo between July 1926 and 1939, only two survived.105 An
even more junior cohort of party leaders, namely, the CC members elected for
the first time in 1934, was also hit hard. Of them, only 21 per cent were re-
elected in 1939. In the post-1945 era Stalin began to take steps to undermine
103 Sung Chul Yang, The North and South Korean Political Systems. A Comparative Analysis (Boulder,
Westview Press, and Seoul, Seoul Press, 1994), pp. 339-341.
104 Buzo, The Guerilla Dynasty, p. 53.
105 Graeme Gill, The Origins of the Stalinist Political System (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1990), pp. 285-286.
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the positions of Molotov and Andreev, but his last purges also affected, either
directly or indirectly, those men who had joined the top leadership after the
Great Terror, such as Voznesensky and Beria. Thus the potential of eventual
consolidation seems to have been weaker in Stalin’s USSR than in Kim Il-
sung’s North Korea, though in 1939-1952 the attrition rate of the CPSU CC
was certainly much lower than it had been in 1930-1939.106 One may also point
out that Soviet Politburo members demoted by Stalin, in contrast with some
KWP leaders, proved unable to regain their lost posts in the dictator’s lifetime.
     The North Korean regime operated in a sociopolitical environment quite
different from Soviet or, say, Hungarian society, and its policies often intensified
these differences. From the very beginning, Kim Il-sung did his best to create a
mass party, recruiting hundreds of thousands of peasants into the North Korean
Workers’ Party. The proportion of peasants was much higher in the NKWP
than in the CPSU.107 One factor facilitating the rapid expansion of the party’s
rural basis was that apart from Ch’ondoggyo believers, the Korean political
scene lacked a mass-based, non-Communist peasant party comparable to the
influential Russian, Ukrainian, Polish, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian, Croatian,
Romanian, and Bulgarian agrarian parties. In this respect North Korea proved
more similar to China and North Vietnam than to Russia and Eastern Europe.
While in Russia the majority of the Bolshevik Party’s rural supporters had
been recruited from the younger generations which „challenged the authority
of their peasant elders,”108 in the mid-1950s the rural organizations of the KWP
were often headed by the oldest, most thoughtful male members of the village
communities.109 This combination of traditional and Communist leadership,
which was also widespread in clan-based ’leftist villages’ in South Korea,110
had a lot in common with the composition of Central Asian rural CPSU
organizations. In 1928 „Turkmen village cells were usually dominated by
aksakgals („white beards,” or elders) – well-off and influential local leaders.”111
On the other hand, the North Korean Youth League, like its Soviet, Chinese,
and North Vietnamese counterparts, played a decisive role in the collectivization
106 T. H. Rigby, „Was Stalin a Disloyal Patron?,” in Articles on Russian and Soviet History 1500-1991.
VII. Stalin and Stalinism, ed. by Alexander Dallin (New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1992), pp.
117-124.
107 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War II, 299-302.
108 Orlando Figes, A People’s Tragedy. The Russian Revolution 1891-1924
 (London: Pimlico, 1997), pp. 790-792.
109 Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 6 December 1954, KTS, 12. doboz, 27/a, 001131/1955.
110 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War II, pp. 248-249.
111 Adrienne L. Edgar, „Genealogy, Class, and Tribal Policy in Soviet Turkmenistan, 1924-1934,” in Slavic
Review Vol. 60 (Summer 2001), No. 2, p. 282.
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of agriculture, since younger peasants showed more willingness to join
cooperatives than did their parents.112
     The social structure that had come into existence in North Korea by the
1970s was more rigidly stratified and more immobile than Soviet society had
been under Stalin. In mid-1964 the following groups were considered
’unreliable’ by the North Korean regime: the family members of those who had
fled to South Korea; the former members of the anti-Communist organizations
created under US occupation; former prisoners-of-war, private entrepreneurs,
and clergymen; persons of South Korean origin, intellectuals trained before
1945, and repatriates from Japan. The discriminative measures also affected
the families of the persons in question.113 In 1964-1969 new categories were
added to this list, and the percentage of ’unreliable elements’ eventually reached
some 25-30 per cent of the population.114 By contrast, the strata the CCP
leadership considered ’hostile’ constituted 8-10 per cent of the Chinese
population in 1964.115 In the Russian SSR 3,5-3,9 per cent of all potential voters
were lishentsy in the 1920s and early 1930s.116 As opposed to Kim Il-sung’s
DPRK, Stalin’s policies were not directed toward the creation of an ossified
caste system. On the one hand, social discrimination gradually abated. For
instance, in December 1935 the Soviet regime abolished social criteria for
entrance to higher education.117 On the other hand, one of the objectives of the
Great Terror was the physical liquidation of ’former kulaks and counter-
revolutionaries,’’church people,’ ’sectarians,’ and common criminals. In July
1937 Yezhov instructed local NKVD organs to execute 70,000 such persons
altogether; 186,500 others were to be deported.118
     In conclusion one may point out that the described differences between Soviet
and North Korean policies refute the claim that Kim Il-sung proved incapable
of the „selective adoption of Stalinist traits …he did not know what to leave
112 Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 9 February 1955, KA, 6. doboz, 12/a, 004063/1955; Hungarian
Embassy to the PRC, Report, 2 November 1955, XIX-J-1-k [Administrative Documents] Kína 1945-1964
[henceforth CA], 18. doboz, 22/d, 004718/4/1955; Hungarian Embassy to the DRV, Report, 14 March 1962,
XIX-J-1-j [Top Secret Documents] Vietnam 1945-1964 [henceforth VTS], 4. doboz, 5/c, 004098/1962. On the
Soviet Komsomol, see, among others, Sheila Fitzpatrick, Stalin’s Peasants, pp. 49-55, 59-60.
113 Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 1 June 1964, KTS, 13. doboz, 27/a, 004092/1964.
114 See, among others, Helen-Louise Hunter, Kim Il-song’s North Korea (Westport-London: Praeger
Publishers, 1999), pp. 3-11.
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out, nor did he know how to leave it out.”119 Certain similarities between the
two regimes resulted from similar political and economic circumstances, rather
than from blind imitation. In contrast with the post-1945 Yugoslav and
Vietnamese party leaderships, in 1945-1956 the leadership of the KWP was as
divided between various, though not necessary homogeneous, factions as the
Bolshevik Party had been in the mid-1920s. It was this situation that enabled
both Stalin and Kim Il-sung to play off their rivals against each other, destroying
the latter one by one. Since North Korea inherited a quite developed industrial
structure from Japanese colonialism, the Soviet model of modernization had
much more relevance for it than for North Vietnam or other Third World
countries.120 In the 1945-1953 period Kim Il-sung had concerned himself
primarily with the unification of Korea, and he subordinated the establishment
of a full-blown Communist system to that goal. (The Soviets, on their part,
seem to have agreed with this priority.) In the post-1953 period  P’yongyang’s
increasing independence from Moscow further lessened the likelihood of
indiscriminate imitation. Kim often resorted to Soviet methods to solve Korean
problems, but he did not hesitate to modify or abandon them whenever it seemed
necessary. In 1954-1955 KWP cadres (unlike their East European and Chinese
counterparts) emphasized that there was no need to launch a campaign against
’kulaks.’ In other cases, however, the policies of the North Korean regime were
more radical than the measures taken by the East European dictatorships. During
and after the Korean War, P’yongyang cracked down on the Catholic and
Protestant churches, portraying Christianity as a religion alien to Korean culture
and hostile to Korean nationalism. As a consequence, no organized Christian
church remained in the DPRK by the mid-1950s.121 By contrast, the North
Vietnamese and East European regimes (with the exception of Albania) were
content with rigorous state control over the churches and the persecution of
dissident clergymen.122
     Nevertheless, the North Korean dictatorship did not diverge from the Soviet
model as significantly as, say, the North Vietnamese regime did. The greatest
119 Buzo, The Guerilla Dynasty, p. 49.
120 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War II, pp. 293., 336-337.
121 Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 14 May 1955, KTS, 12. doboz, 27/a, 006047/1955; Hungarian
Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 4 December 1954, KTS, 6. doboz, 5/cb, 001142/1955; Hungarian Embassy to
the PRC, Report, 14 April 1955, CA, 18. doboz, 22/d, 004719/1955.
122 It is necessary to point out, however, that Christians had always constituted a minority in North Korea.
Thus Kim Il-sung’s policies were somewhat similar to the measures taken by the Bulgarian Communist
dictatorship. The Chervenkov regime treated the Catholic and Protestant churches more harshly than the Orthodox
church that represented the overwhelming majority of the population. For instance, in 1952 a Catholic bishop
and three priests were sentenced to death, and soon after all Catholic priests, monks, and nuns were expelled
from Bulgaria.
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purge the Vietnamese Workers’ Party ever experienced took place in the course
of the 1953-1956 land reform campaign, which was patterned after the Chinese
model. By December 1955 the rent-reduction campaign had affected 7,77
million people, i.e. 63 per cent of the population. Of the 44,444 ’landlords’
identified, 3,939 were tried and 1,175 executed. The second stage of the
campaign (the land reform proper) had affected 4 million people by December
1955, of whom 18,738 were ’revealed’ as ’concealed landlords’ (these
’revelations’ led to 3,312 trials and 162 executions). The scope of the repression
can be gauged from that during the ’correction’ of the land reform’s ’errors’
(1956-1957), the authorities released 23,748 political prisoners.123 By contrast,
the North Korean land reform, though partly inspired by Chinese examples,
proved essentially bloodless, as did the East European land reforms.124 The
North Vietnamese land reform campaign was accompanied by a two-stage party
purge. The VWP and the Youth League lost some 80,000 and 50,000 members
respectively. By December 1955 32,200 persons had been expelled from the
VWP, but only 10,501 new members entered the party. Since party membership
stood at 324,000 in November 1955, these losses would have been high enough
even if the regime had not dissolved nearly 80 per cent of the village and district
party committees.125 While the magnitude of the purge was comparable to that
of the East European Stalinist purges, its logic proved quite different. In North
Vietnam the repressive measures did not affect the top leadership at all, though
they moved up to the provincial level. While the security service played an
active role in the hunt for ’saboteurs,’ it was the land-reform cadres who were
primarily responsible for the terror. By contrast, in the Soviet Union, Eastern
Europe, and North Korea political repression remained, by and large, a
monopoly of the security services. As opposed to the Soviet and North Korean
dictatorships (but similarly to China), the North Vietnamese regime had a much
weaker basis in the urban centers than in the countryside. In February 1955 the
VWP had only 8,000 members in Hanoi, and on 21 April 1959 Pham Van Dong
told a Hungarian diplomat that „the party is still very weak in the cities.”126
123 Hungarian Embassy to the DRV, Report, 7 December 1955, VTS, 4. doboz, 5/c, 00419/1956; Hungarian
Embassy to the DRV, Report, 20 September 1957, VTS, 4. doboz, 5/c, 002745/1/1957. See also Edwin E.
Moise, Land Reform in China and North Vietnam. Consolidating the Revolution at the Village Level (Chapel
Hill-London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1983).
124 Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War I. Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes
1945-1947 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 396-397, 414-417.
125 Hungarian Embassy to the DRV, Report, 28 November 1955, VTS, 9. doboz, 27/d, 00426/1956;
Hungarian Embassy to the DRV, Report, 29 May 1957, VTS, 9. doboz, 27/d, 003858/1957; Hungarian Embassy
to the DRV, Report, 26 August 1956, VTS, 4. doboz, 5/c, 007218/1956; Hungarian Embassy to the DRV,
Report, 10 July 1958, VTS, 4. doboz, 5/c, 00286/2/1958.
126 Hungarian Embassy to the DRV, Report, 21 February 1955, XIX-J-1-k [Administrative Documents]
Vietnam 1945-1964 [henceforth VA], 4. doboz, 15/b, 004128/1955; Hungarian Embassy to the PRC, Report,
23 May 1959, VTS, 2. doboz, 4/bc, 004110/1959.
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Thus the purge that shattered the rural organizations of the VWP undermined
the regime’s stability to such an extent that the leaders felt compelled to re-
examine their policies, and rehabilitate tens of thousands of victims.
Conclusion
     The policies of the various Communist regimes had a lot in common, but
one should not regard all such similarities as the results of direct Soviet pressure.
The following quotation from Liu Shaoqi reveals a lot about the psyche of
Communist leaders. On 30 November 1963 the Chinese President discussed
the negative consequences of the Great Leap Forward with some Hungarian
diplomats. One of the latter described how disastrous the agricultural policy of
the Rakosi regime had been in the 1950s, whereupon Liu replied: „We had
heard of these experiences of yours. And we also had heard of the experiences
of the Poles. That time, however, we did not give credence to it. We had not
given credence to it until it also happened over here. Now it also occured over
here, and now we have experiences of our own. Everybody considers his own
experiences the most important.”127 Practically every Communist regime
underwent a phase of ’leftist deviation,’ no matter whether it had direct contacts
with Stalin’s Soviet Union or not. Characteristically, in 1949 Tito reacted to
Soviet criticism by speeding up collectivization. His security chief, Rankovic,
planned to organize a show trial which should have „proven” that the
’Cominformist’ party leader Hebrang had been an Ustasha and Gestapo agent.
Hebrang’s wife and some of his acquaintances were indeed subjected to torture
in order to extract false confessions from them. „The split that emancipated the
KPJ from the Soviet Union [initially] promoted home-grown Stalinism.”128 As
indicated earlier, the East European party purges were not rooted solely in the
Stalin-Tito rift, and the repressive measures taken after the South-east European
partisan takeovers revealed the substantial indigenous basis of Communist
radicalism. While Soviet Stalinism did produce a decisive effect on the
development of that radicalism, the latter’s formative stage was not the 1944-
1953 period but the 1920s and 1930s. In these decades the various Communist
parties underwent a process of ’Bolshevization,’ which resulted in the expulsion
of many leaders who were inclined to think for themselves and reluctant to
look up to the current Soviet Vozhd’. Following the Soviet-inspired purges of
127 Hungarian Embassy to the PRC, Report, 29 December 1963, CTS, 2. doboz, 1/c, 001812/5/1964.
128 Banac, With Stalin against Tito, pp. 120-121, 134-136.
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1937-1940, the CPY became the sort of party it would remain thereafter: a
monolithic organization headed by Tito.129
     The impact Stalin’s USSR had on other countries manifested itself in various
forms, both direct and indirect. As a neighboring country, it annexed territories
at the expense of Finland, the Baltic states, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania,
and Japan. As an occupying power, it enabled the Mongolian, East German,
Polish, Hungarian, Romanian, and North Korean parties, some of which would
not have been capable of seizing power, to establish Communist regimes. As
the supreme patron of the ’little Stalins,’ the Soviet dictator could, and did,
shape the policies of most contemporary Communist dictatorships. Finally, the
Soviet Union, as a political and economic system, served as an ideological
model for parties and countries well beyond the reach of the MGB and the Red
Army. Ideological influence was the widest of these concentric circles but also
the weakest one. The Yugoslav case demonstrated that the enthusiastic adoption
of Soviet methods was not necessary a guarantee for loyalty to the Soviet Union,
since the subjective interests of the USSR did not always prove compatible
with its role as the ideological center of the international Communist movement.
     Due to the concentric circles of Soviet influence, the gradual transformation
of Soviet Stalinism, and the tactical flexibility of the Soviet dictator, a
paradoxical development took place in the Communist world. Certain
Communist parties and regimes, such as Yugoslavia and Albania, resorted to
Stalinist repressive measures without explicit Soviet encouragement, or even
in defiance of Soviet directives. On the other hand, the Soviet Stalinist system
was never adopted in its entirety. Of Stalin’s loyal clients, only Choibalsan
duplicated the Soviet Great Terror, but he did not carry out the collectivization
of agriculture. Thus to ask whether there was one Communism or many
Communisms is to pose a false antinomy. A certain intensity of repression (the
’minimal level’) was characteristic of every Communist regime, but some
dictatorships, such as the ones headed by Stalin, Hoxha, Choibalsan, Mao,
Kim Il-sung, and Pol Pot, exceeded that level by far. While one cannot attribute
every manifestation of Communist repression to Soviet influence, one cannot
explain every aspect of Stalin’s terror by pointing at Communist ideology.
Although the framework of a Stalinist regime undoubtedly limited the number
of alternatives a leader could take, certain alternatives did exist. Stalin’s tactical
flexibility highlights, rather than diminishes, his personal responsibility for the
repressive measures he took. In the 1948-1953 period political paranoia was
129 Ibid., 70-78.
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widespread enough in Eastern Europe, but it did not lead to a bloodbath
comparable to the Soviet and Mongolian Great Purges. In addition, the dynamic
of East European repression was not influenced by the ’Soviet model’ alone: it
was also shaped by the specific traditions of the local Communist parties, the
latter’s sociopolitical environment, and the events of World War II.
